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This study investigates the use of mobile data to 
understand patterns of population movements and 
disease transmission during the Covid-19 outbreak. It 
also focuses on understanding the implications of using 
this data for individual privacy. Using a mixed methods 
approach, we present 10 rich qualitative interviews and 
412 survey responses from participants across the 
Nordics. Our novel results show that the use of mobile 
data can be characterized by two main categories: 
validation data and complementary data. We also 
identify five implications for practice: sharing resources 
and expertise between health agencies and telecom 
companies; extended collaboration with multiple 
network operators; cross-disciplinary collaboration 
among multiple parties; developing data and privacy 
guidelines; and developing novel methods and tools to 
address the trade-off between maintaining individual 
privacy and obtaining detailed information from mobile 
data. These implications may inform immediate and 
future actions to prepare for, mitigate, and control the 
spread of infectious diseases using mobile data. They 
also show privacy-driven limitations of mobile data in 
terms of data accuracy, richness, and scope.   
1. Introduction  
Modern digital technologies such as smartphones, 
the Internet of Things (IoT), and Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) are ubiquitous in our daily lives and generate 
massive amounts of real-time data, so-called big data 
[1,2,3]. However, their application to understand 
disease transmission during the first pandemic in the era 
of big data and the spread of the Coronavirus disease 
(Covid-19), has only recently been acknowledged [4]. 
These technologies are major sources of data and 
provide detailed information about spatial and temporal 
dynamics [1,5] that can be critical to understand 
population movements in disease outbreaks.  
Nowadays, in the midst of a global effort to combat 
the spread of Covid-19, governments and public health 
authorities in various countries are using mobile data to 
analyze population movements in order to monitor, 
prepare for, and control the transmission of the 
disease.  One of the most important parameters in 
monitoring and eventually controlling pandemics is 
transmissibility, that is person-to-person transmission 
[6]. This emphasis on human movement was already 
acknowledged since the time of the Black Death when 
authorities were surveilling the movement of people and 
enforced quarantine time for anyone suspected to show 
symptoms of an infectious disease. [7].   
Public health surveillance is said to provide early 
and timely data about key epidemiological, clinical, and 
virological characteristics of pandemic viruses [8,9,10]. 
Thacker and Stroup [11] pointed out that modern era 
disease surveillance was initiated in the 1950s. Usually, 
public health surveillance involves collecting data from 
multiple sources, such as, hospitals, clinics, public 
health centres, public health labs, and individual 
physicians, which are then stored and shared using a 
national public health information system [11,12]. This 
kind of surveillance has been described as fragmented 
mainly because of poor coordination among 
surveillance systems, which often results in ineffective 
data [8,11]. For instance, Briand et al. [11] discussed 
global surveillance information systems appropriated by 
the World Health Organization [13] such as the Global 
Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN). This system is 
designed to report geographically-based influenza-like 
activity using a web-based electronic data reporting, 
query, and mapping system. They explained that such 
systems entail challenges including timeliness of 
information, lack of surveillance capacities to monitor 
an outbreak over an extended period of time, and 
accuracy problems.  At times of disease outbreaks, such 
challenges may prove critical when there is an urgent 
need for timely and accurate data to monitor the rapid 
transmission of highly infectious diseases [8,11,14].  
Current data tools enable the collection and analysis 
of massive amounts of data from multiple sources and 
offer novel opportunities for real-time detection and 
monitoring of disease outbreaks like Covid-19. Mobile 
phones are major sources for big data especially that it 
is possible for every action taken by a mobile user to be 
traced and geo-tagged [1]. For instance, many mobile 
communication companies offer location-based services 
to provide data for businesses about where customers 
buy things. These services use real-time data about 
customers which allow businesses to understand not 





only customers’ locations, but also how their needs and 
interests change [1], making it possible to do spatio-
temporal behaviour analysis of an individual’s every 
move [15,16]. In the context of disease outbreaks, there 
is already evidence in literature that mobile data is 
useful in understanding population movement patterns 
by making predictions of vulnerable geographic areas 
and developments in infection rates [5,17,18,19]. Also, 
the potential of using real-time data from mobile 
communications about spatio-temporal dynamics of 
individuals and populations may help with rapid 
detection and response which facilitates preparedness 
measures by public health authorities. As Covid-19 
continues to spread around the world, countries like 
China, South Korea, Singapore, and Israel [34] have 
tasked their intelligence units to use surveillance tracing 
[33] for tracking new Covid-19 infections. For instance, 
Israel’s Shin Bet used its cellphone localization 
intelligence capabilities to identify individuals who 
have been in contact with others who tested positive for 
Covid-19. Other countries like Sweden chose a different 
approach to use mobile data where no privacy-invasive 
surveillance was applied. Telecom companies in 
collaboration with health authorities to understand 
general movement patterns using some sort of proximity 
surveillance [33] and data aggregation [16]. 
While the potential of mobile data may be 
promising, it also comes with limitations regarding data 
accuracy and privacy [5,18]. It is also not yet clear how 
mobile data may be useful in providing details of 
population movement patterns (i.e., how, when, and 
where people move) [5,17] that can be used for 
understanding disease transmission dynamics [5]. As 
such, there is a need for a nuanced understanding of 
spatial and temporal factors of population movement 
which is evident to be a vehicle for disease transmission 
[5,9,19,20]. The near absence of peer-reviewed research 
on using mobile data in disease outbreaks like Covid-19 
prompts an urgent need for knowledge contributions 
[22]. The aim of the current study is therefore twofold: 
first, to develop an understanding of using mobile data 
to analyse population movement patterns to monitor the 
spread of Covid-19; second, to identify implications of 
using this data for understanding disease transmission 
dynamics as well individual privacy. These aims are 
achieved by seeking answers to the following questions: 
How can mobile data be used to understand the 
transmission of Covid-19? What are the implications of 
using mobile data for individual privacy? 
2. Human movement, mobile data, and 
privacy in pandemics 
It is well established in epidemiological literature 
that human movement and international travel to 
endemic places often resulted in imported cases and 
disease outbreaks [9,17,19,20]. Jiang & Luo [17], for 
instance, investigated the influence of human movement 
on the transmission of Covid-19 and concluded that it is 
a key driver for the rapid transmission of the disease. In 
absence of effective prevention and treatment during 
disease transmission of an emerging infectious disease 
such as Covid-19, public health preparedness is the most 
important measure to minimize mortality rates. 
Developing models and tools to help in predicting the 
geographic spread and timing of epidemics is critical for 
spatio-temporal targeted interventions and epidemic 
preparedness [19].  
Epidemiologists often use mathematical and 
computational models to study spatio-temporal 
dynamics of disease outbreaks [23]. The purpose of 
using these models is to forecast outbreak dynamics 
such as peak time, peak height, and magnitude in order 
to inform policy makers and public health practitioners 
regarding preparedness measures and the allocation of 
resources [23]. However, making reliable forecasts 
using these models proved to be challenging due to the 
difficulty of making timely forecasts [8]. In this respect, 
contact tracing has been used as a standard strategy for 
tackling new or re-emerging infections especially when 
the number of infectious cases is low, whether in the 
beginning of a pandemic or in its later stages [24]. While 
contact tracing is deemed an effective measure to break 
transmission chains [24, 25], the process of contacting 
infected individuals to name their contactees for 
locating unidentified cases can be slow resulting in more 
disease transmission. This is because the tools used for 
contact tracing, also called partner notification, such as 
face-to-face interviews do not produce real-time data 
about spatio-temporal dynamics of human movement. 
Eames & Keeling [24] explained that accurate 
modelling of contact tracing requires explicit 
information about disease-transmission pathways from 
each individual, and hence the network of contacts.  
More recently, many countries around the world 
turned into using digital contact tracing based on mobile 
apps [32, 33] in countering Covid-19. Urbaczewski & 
Lee [34] mentioned that as many as 80 contact tracing 
apps were used in 50 countries just a few months after 
the first cases of Covid-19 were detected. Mobile-based 
contact tracing uses cell phone network data, global 
positioning system (GPS), and Wi-Fi signals to identify 
geolocations and measure the proximity to infected 
individuals. Riemer et al. [33] identified three different 
contact tracing approaches including traditional manual 
tracing, surveillance tracing, often by governments, and 
uses surveillance technologies such as CCTV cameras 
and facial recognition, and proximity tracing which is 
based on collecting proximity data when contact, rather 
than tracing, between people take place. Countries that 
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used surveillance tracing enjoyed varying degrees of 
success such as Israel, Singapore, and China [34] in 
terms of reducing Covid-19 cases but faced widespread 
criticism for privacy and even human rights violations. 
Often these governments use laws (e.g., Shin Bet Data 
Collection law in Israel) which allows them to collect 
identifiable data about individuals. In Singapore the 
prime minister asked citizens to install a tracing app 
called TraceTogether on their personal mobile phones. 
The use of mobile data in disease outbreaks might 
contribute into traditional public health surveillance by 
offering explicit and critical information. Cinnamon et 
al. [18] discussed that mobile communications produce 
massive longitudinal datasets or ‘mobile big data’, 
especially Call Detail Records (CDRs) which include 
data about communication time, a unique caller ID, and 
the location of the cellular tower or base station through 
which the communication is routed. They argued that 
CDR data has the potential to illuminate spatio-temporal 
dynamics of populations in real-time, which can be 
useful for preparedness purposes at times of infectious 
disease outbreaks. This can be seen in [19], a study 
which develops an epidemiological model of disease 
transmission during the dengue epidemic in Pakistan 
using mobile data. They explained that mobile data offer 
direct measures of human aggregation and movement 
patterns that allow for accurate mapping of changing 
patterns of vulnerability in a country.   
However, while mobile communications may 
produce massive amounts of real-time data, their 
application and use may be limited in practice. Data 
accuracy is a major problem because of privacy and 
security measures applied by telecom operators such as 
data aggregation and anonymization [18]. There are also 
other limitations caused by the lack of guidelines to use 
mobile data that can be acceptable by customers and 
useful to health agencies [18,19]. In general, preserving 
the accuracy of data while maintaining individuals’ 
privacy remains one of the key challenges of the big data 
era [26]. Acquisti et al. [27] suggested that regulatory 
interventions are needed to address the challenges of a 
rapidly evolving privacy landscape. The vulnerability 
with privacy remains alarming because one technical 
negligible act can lead to revealing details about users’ 
identity, which can infringe privacy rights, such as those 
created by the GDPR. The analysis of users’ locations, 
for instance, has shown that people tend to develop a 
negative attitude towards it and adjust their privacy 
settings to gain a sense of control over their data [28]. 
The potential loss of control over personal data during 
the Covid-19 outbreak has led Human Rights Watch to 
be concerned about countries that use mobile data to 
collect location data due to risks of revealing sensitive 
individual information.  
3. Research method and settings 
3.1. Use of mobile data during Covid-19  
The empirical context for the current study is 
Sweden and Norway where public health agencies 
initiated collaborations with telecom companies to use 
mobile data for understanding Covid-19 transmission:  
The collaboration between the Swedish Public 
Health Agency (FHM) and telecom operator Telia: 
FHM is the national public health agency in Sweden 
which is responsible for “disseminating scientifically 
based knowledge to promote health and prevent disease 
and injury”. One main task of FHM is to protect against 
communicable diseases on a national level. On April 8, 
2020, FHM announced on its official website a 
collaboration with the largest telecom company in the 
Nordics, Telia, to use mobile data in understanding 
population movement to counter the Spread of Covid-
19. The statement said that FHM will use mobile data to 
study how population movement affect the virus spread 
as well as provide a basis for enacting measures and 
assessing existing measures. To obtain this data, FHM 
has access to a dashboard which is developed based on 
an existing service owned by Telia, called Crowd 
Insights. The raw data is the signals between mobile 
phones and base stations which can give an approximate 
location of the mobile phone at a certain time. Patterns 
of how groups of more than 5 people move during 24-
hour time chunks are collected, extrapolated to represent 
the whole population, and visualized in Crowd Insights.  
The collaboration between the Norwegian Institute 
of Public Health (NIPH) and Telenor: NIPH is a 
national competence institution placed directly under 
the ministry of health and care services which has the 
responsibility for controlling infectious diseases. In 
January 2020, and as the Covid-19 disease was 
spreading globally, a senior data scientist who leads a 
small research center at Telenor approached his 
colleagues at Telenor and NIPH and suggested an 
initiative to explore the potential of using mobile data to 
understand the transmission of Covid-19 in Norway. 
The aim was to develop a regional model focused on 
municipalities to predict the transmission of Covid-19. 
Since then, Telenor provided NIPH with daily updates 
and aggregated data sets that are processed using a data 
analytics system called Spark which shows a 
quantification of patterns of travels and movements 
across different regions in the country. Similar to Telia, 
the data from Telenor is aggregated and anonymized but 
aggregation is done based on a group of 20 people. The 
data is eventually shared by Telenor into a secure server 
on a daily basis which NIPH can access and download. 
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3.2. Participant selection and data collection 
The empirical data were collected using qualitative 
interviews and a quantitative survey. The interviews 
aimed at collecting data from experts involved in using 
mobile data during the Covid-19 outbreak, while the 
survey was focused on collecting data from people 
affected by the outbreak to get individual perspectives 
on privacy issues. The aim was to triangulate the data to 
get various perspectives from two different groups of 
participants and to draw out better empirical insights.   
The qualitative empirical data were collected from 
participants employed by FHM, Telia Sweden, NIPH, 
and Telenor Norway. The selection of these participants 
was done using a combination of purposive and 
snowball sampling. The sample included participants 
specialized in three main areas: data analytics, data 
privacy, and epidemiological models. All of them are 
experts, and most hold a PhD, in their respective areas, 
and have been working for several years in their 
organizations. Our first communication was made with 
FHM in Sweden through sending an email to inquire 
about their collaboration with Telia. This resulted in 
access to our ‘first contact’ who is a data analyst and 
was responsible for the collaboration with Telia. To 
expand the scope of our study, we took the same 
approach with Telenor Norway and got in touch with a 
senior data scientist who initiated the collaboration with 
NIPH. Our first contacts were asked to recommend 
others who can join our study and the sample has then 
gradually increased up to a total of 10 participants as 
shown in Table 1. below. 
The primary vehicle for the qualitative data 
collection was the interview method [30]. An interview 
protocol was developed to guide the conversation with 
the participants, which was based on a review of 
literature on using mobile data in pandemics [5, 17, 18] 
privacy issues [16, 27]. This protocol was structured 
into four main parts including general info about the 
interviewee and the collaboration between the agency 
and the telecom operator, technology for mobile data 
collection and analysis, data-driven health measures, 
and privacy and legal issues. While each part contained 
predefined questions, the interviews were largely semi-
structured, and emphasis was placed on following up on 
curious answers rather than strictly sticking to protocol.  
All participants were interviewed via an online 
medium. The geographical distribution of the 
participants as well as the restrictions on face-to-face 
meetings during the Covid-19 outbreak were major 
reasons for choosing an online medium, Zoom and 
Microsoft Teams, to conduct the interviews. The 
interviews were conducted between May and June 2020, 
and the range of interviewing time was between 50 and 
80 minutes. Ethical issues were communicated and 
permission to record the interviews was obtained from 
all the participants, except one (read more below). All 
interviews were eventually transcribed verbatim, and 
the participants were sent copies of our findings for 
validity checks [31]. It should be noted that a focus 
group interview involving all authors of the paper was 
conducted with two professors from Lund University, 
Sweden who lead a project on using a mobile contact 
tracing app for studying Covid-19 transmission. An 
additional interview with a third professor involved in 
the project took place at a later time and tackled the third 
part of the interview guide which is focused on privacy 
matters. Permission to record was not granted by this 
participant, but a confirmed list of notes from the 
interview was approved. The focus group and the 
additional interview with the third professor were aimed 
at getting a general understanding of how a mobile app 
can be used to collect data about Covid-19.  
3.3. Survey development and demographics 
The survey was aimed at collecting a user 
perspective on using mobile data with emphasis on 
aspects such as trust, population movement, privacy 
issues, and public health. The questions developed for 
the survey were based on both relevant literature as well 
as insights from the interviews as our primary source for 
analyses. The interview data inspired our attention for 
using sensitive terms in the survey that could be 
misinterpreted by our respondents such as avoiding to 
use terms like “monitoring” and “surveillance” and 
choosing to use “population” rather than “individual”. 
The survey was designed by the authors, primarily 
focusing on our interview guide, where a back-and-forth 
activity between the authors led to formulate the survey 
in Qualtrics, further distributed by Prolific. Each 
participant was reimbursed with a recommended 
amount by Prolific to respond to our survey. The 
distribution of the survey focused on targeting a specific 
population of our interest that led to custom pre-
screening, with nationality being of key importance, 
since we aimed at collecting data from citizens in the 
Nordics only. Out of 850 matching participants, we had 
a response rate of 48.47% with 412 recorded responses. 
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We kept the survey active until we reached 400+ 
responses, then when we realized that the rest of the 
matching profiles were not interested to join our survey, 
before we closed the survey and agreed that the number 
of respondents in relation to the number of questions 
was optimal for our intended quantitative analyses. Each 
question had to be answered before moving to the next 
question/page. Due to limited space, the full survey can 
be accessed via an active link in the footnote below.1 
Table 2 below shows the demographics for 
highlighting our controls, however, controls like gender 
in particular were not key to witness any differences, but 
it shows that the majority of our Prolific matching 
participants were male and yet we did not consider this 
to be an issue and that it would make an impact in our 
analysis concerning the intention of our study. The 
reason why we chose nationality as a factor, whilst not 
considering country of residence, is because we realized 
that certain respondents (e.g., an exchange student) may 
have resided in a country for a short time (e.g., months) 
which makes it harder to generally reflect on the work 
done by the public health agency for instance. 
 
3.4. Data analysis 
Our data analysis process can be described as 
analytic induction [31]. Patton [31] describes analytic 
induction as an analysis technique where one starts 
analyzing the data deductively followed by an inductive 
analysis of the data to generate insights. So, we first 
used the literature deductively to develop our interview 
and survey questions as well as conduct initial reading 
and understanding of the interview data. After 
transcribing the data, all authors read the interview 
transcripts separately. An author would first read the 
transcript thoroughly to develop an overall 
understanding of the interview. This step was driven by 
both previous understandings from literature 
(deduction) as well as an emergent understanding 




meaningful data segments (i.e. quotes) from each 
transcript were identified. The identification of data 
segments was essentially an interpretive activity which 
involved making sense of the text as well as drawing 
meaning out of it which is either literature-based or 
emergent. Each author applied this interpretive, sense-
making activity in all interview transcripts. Eventually, 
a number of relevant data segments were identified in 
each transcript and coded using descriptive terms (e.g., 
privacy) for further cross-transcript, all-author analysis.  
The next step in the analysis process was done in a 
meeting involving all three authors of the paper where 
each transcript was discussed. The authors discussed all 
data segments identified earlier by them in each 
transcript and then filtered out the most relevant and 
meaningful segments to develop higher-level themes 
and patterns. This discussion was critical to develop a 
shared and consistent understanding of the data by all 
authors as well as selecting key themes and patterns 
together with strong empirical data segments that 
support them. These selected data segments form the 
basis of our empirical findings which are presented 
below. For survey data, the analysis was performed 
using descriptive statistics to develop a general 
overview of issues related to analyzing population 
movement in terms of benefits, trust and privacy. We 
then used the key control variables (gender, age and 
nationality) to see if they impacted the views differently 
in correlation to benefits, trust and privacy matters.  
4. Findings 
4.1. Mobile data aggregation and the 
development of population movement patterns 
Mobile data processed by mobile network operators 
are usually generated from raw cellular signals between 
customers’ mobile phones and base stations or cell 
towers. This data includes a variety of details including 
the location, since each individual phone connects to a 
base station whenever a phone user makes a call or 
sends a text. Due to data sensitivity, strict privacy 
regulations are enforced by telecom companies to 
ensure no individual is identified. Data aggregation, 
performed using data analytics tools and applications, is 
a key measure for ensuring user privacy and anonymity 
at both telecom companies discussed in this paper. 
Mobile data referred to here is therefore aggregated 
data. The Director of Privacy at Telenor Norway 
explained data aggregation: “...aggregation is basically 
a part of anonymization measures, so it's one measure 
to receive like a good outcome of anonymization and to 
Page 7155
basically end up with a good a anonymization. So, the 
lower the level or the number of people or the group of 
people, the easier it will be to identify one person out of 
these...so it doesn't not have to be possible to re-identify 
based on all the datasets available.”  
The aim from data aggregation in the context of 
Covid-19 outbreak is to develop generic high-level 
patterns of population movements. These patterns are 
operationalized into so-called “origin-destination” 
matrices that can help to show how many people went 
from one point to another (i.e. from one municipality to 
another), or how many people are present in a specific 
location. The Senior Data Scientist at Telenor explained 
data aggregation and the development of matrices of 
movement patterns as follows: “...the individual, 
personal location data of all customers are processed 
and aggregated into origin-destination matrices. When 
we talk about travel patterns, one should have in mind 
origin-destination matrices, because this is the 
operationalization of travel pattern.” At Telia Sweden, 
similar origin-destination matrices are developed where 
data aggregation is also applied to ensure anonymity. 
The Head of Data Insights explained how data 
aggregation is done and the level of granularity that is 
possible to generate from the data, he said: “...our data 
is anonymous and aggregated so it's not very granular, 
we can go down to 500*500 meters at best, and this is 
only in highly populated areas, like if you go out in the 
countryside, due to anonymization and aggregation 
rules you might look at , you know, 10*18 meter grids. 
So, we cannot see if people are very close, but we can 
see how many are in this 500*500-meter square.” 
Eventually, this aggregated data is visualized using tools 
like Tableau into an interactive dashboard that contains 
rich and dynamic insights as well as analytical models. 
The content in the dashboard is the main outcome of 
data aggregation for FHM in Sweden. They have access 
to this dashboard from Telia Sweden where they can see 
maps with travel patterns across the country. 
4.2. Potential use and limitations of mobile 
data in the Covid-19 outbreak 
The Senior Data Scientist from Telenor Norway 
described the potential of mobile data using a metaphor 
of steering a ship in the ocean. He explained that the 
ability to make predictions two or three weeks in 
advance is important to know whether the ship is 
heading towards a wreckage or smooth water. In the 
context of the Covid-19 outbreak, he stated that the aim 
is to help NIPH “build a regional model based on 
municipalities in Norway predicting coronavirus 
spread” so they can predict when and where the spread 
might be happening. In Sweden, a data expert from 
FHM explained that one of the main aims why the 
agency wanted to look into mobile data is to see if 
people actually commit to the recommendations. He 
said: “we try to encourage people not to travel during 
the holidays and stay at home. You know just to get this 
confirmation that people have actually listened and 
heard what we say…”. The Head of Data Insights at 
Telia Sweden shared an elaborate view of the potential 
of using mobile data, he said: “It is really two parts. It 
is about understanding the effect of the 
recommendations to see if citizens are adhering to 
recommendations...And in the second part is using the 
dataset, this data source as an input in epidemiological 
models.”   
In this respect, while survey data show that more 
than half of our respondents believe that understanding 
population movements using mobile data is beneficial 
for health agencies, many of them do not see how this 
can be beneficial for them at the individual or 
community levels. We also noticed that the majority of 
our survey respondents, more than 60% (248), reported 
that understanding population movements is beneficial 
to stop the spread of Covid-19, while around 17% (74) 
did not consider that it is beneficial. The respondents 
who did not consider any benefits were evenly 
represented across the Nordics, and almost all of them 
seemed to be worried about their anonymity. Further, 
using mobile data as a potential data source for 
epidemiological modelling is a novel area of interest for 
epidemiologists since it is not something they used 
before in a disease outbreak. The Head of Methods 
Development at NIPH provided an epidemiological 
perspective on the potential role and importance of 
mobile data, she said: “If I should say to you when these 
mobile data are mainly important, it is in the phase 
where there is not so large level of transmission 
occurring because at a certain point we'll have a lot of 
local transmission and therefore, transport between 
places becomes less important,.” Similarly, the Head of 
Analysis at FHM, further elaborated: “It is not a 
question of being better prepared if we have access to 
more mobile data. It is knowing the quality of the data, 
what can it be useful for, how can we transfer these data 
into some kind of knowledge or predictions.” Despite the 
lack of clarity on how mobile data can be incorporated 
in epidemiological work, the Head of Data Insights at 
Telia Sweden believe that the kind of insights they 
generate using their algorithms from mobile data can be 
useful to epidemiological work in two areas. He 
explained: “...the first one is, in these epidemiological 
models you need to estimate the amount of contact 
people have. It makes sense, right? Viruses cannot 
transmit disease unless you're in contact with someone, 
so they typically have some sort of value that 
approximates contact...the second part is … in 
epidemiological models you want to model the special 
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aspect...so these are the two parts: it is the estimation of 
probability contact and then migration patterns.”  
The Head of Analysis at FHM, discussed how the 
data is currently used during the Covid-19 outbreak and 
the limitations of using such data, she stressed: “If we 
could have data, which age groups and from which 
regions the travelers come from, it will be useful for 
understanding and validating the (disease) dynamics 
...As it is right now, since it is aggregated, we have it as 
a complement, as one piece of knowledge to our 
knowledge”. There are also other issues that might limit 
the potential of mobile data in disease outbreaks due to 
privacy concerns. For instance, the Director of Privacy 
at Telenor Norway explained that when aggregated 
datasets do not conform to the rules, the algorithm used 
to analyze the data and develop movement patterns will 
delete the information, which is in fact a censoring 
process. She explained: “… we do aggregate it 
(movement patterns) to 20 people so that we can really 
make sure that the data is actually anonymized, because 
like you might have an area somewhere where very little 
people in Norway or where a specific point of time there 
were only one person and then we basically without 
mentioning which this person this is but say, well, at this 
point of time there was some person, this would not be 
anonymous data so all datasets where are less than 20 
people will be deleted.” Another limitation observed in 
the data was related to collecting “real-time” data. The 
Head of Data Insights at Telia Sweden discussed legal 
and ethical concerns for why they won’t and can’t 
collect real-time data. He said: “We do not do real-time, 
like same-day information, because of the legal 
anonymization process, and also the ethical 
consideration, because knowing where large groups of 
people are, there could be potential negative uses from 
that. So it is both legal but also ethical safeguard that is 
48 hours delayed.” Further, the Data Protection Officer 
at Telia Sweden identified privacy-related factors that 
affect how mobile data are used. She said: “...we need to 
have quite a lot of data to start with, and it also means 
that the product works best in areas where there is high 
population density that we have a lot of people whose 
data we can have. The second thing with mobile network 
data is that the locations are not accurate, because the 
data that we get is the mobile devices connected to so 
called "Mobile Cells” or like network cells... Well, we 
don't know the exact GPS location of the person...” 
4.3. Privacy issues 
Live and continuous data streams from cellular 
towers or base stations are critical components for the 
delivery of mobile services by network operators. These 
data streams include information about every mobile 
phone user connected to the network. A Senior Data 
Scientist at Telenor Norway stated: “If you use your 
cellphone today, then you basically just have to accept 
that this kind of data is collected.” Despite this, the 
process of collecting and analyzing mobile data is still 
done according to strict privacy regulations. We asked 
the Head of Data Insights from Telia Sweden whether 
this process presents surveillance. He emphasized that 
the company uses aggregate rather than individual data 
to develop generic insights, he explained: “...to me when 
you say surveillance that means you're tracking 
someone. And the term surveillance from a legal 
standpoint is also not optimal because it can mean 
something else. So, when we provide these insights, we 
cannot see individuals, it is anonymous, it is aggregated 
information. So, we're not surveilling anyone. There is 
no surveillance here, there are no individuals in here. 
What we are providing is general insights on larger 
movements of people in society.”  
A legal viewpoint on this was offered by a Data 
Protection Officer from Telia Sweden who explained 
that telecom operators have to commit to telecom 
privacy laws, she said: “...how the data can be 
anonymized so that we can create meaningful statistics 
to show people movements but at the same time no 
individual is identifiable within the data. We have 
created a process that, well, processes the data from the 
network and remove the direct identifiers, and group the 
data to a certain group size so we basically know that 
there is a group of people in this location at a given time, 
but we don't know who the people are. And if the groups 
are too small, if that's only one person in a certain 
location, then that data will be deleted, and we don't 
have that location at all. So, the grouping (aggregation) 
is the key”. Still, the Head of Method and Development 
at NIPH explained that sometimes people’s movements 
across municipalities can be limited and even data 
aggregation would not help in protecting their privacy 
which raises concerns about how it can be used. She 
said: “...you will also have issues there because let's say 
we take municipality in the very south end of Norway, 
and you take a small municipality in the northern part 
of Norway; the amount of people that travel between 
these two municipalities is very small, so also there you 
can enter some kind of privacy issues.”  
In general, whether these measures by telecom 
operators are sufficient to protect individual privacy 
while leveraging the potential of mobile data is a critical 
issue for all actors involved especially mobile phone 
users. Our survey data, for instance, show that more than 
60% of our Danish respondents did not trust their 
authorities and more than 50% of our Swedish 
respondents reported the same when it comes to using 
mobile data to understand population movements. The 
rest of the Nordics seem to trust their authorities in more 
than 70% of the respondents. Furthermore, while 
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telecom companies emphasize that generating patterns 
of population movements is done using aggregated data 
based on groups of individuals rather than an individual, 
about 50% of our respondents believe that such patterns 
are analysed with identifiable personal data, with 20% 
of them strongly believing this likelihood.  
5. General discussion  
The use of mobile data during disease outbreaks is 
a novel phenomenon and a new data source to support 
epidemiological work. While public health surveillance 
that is based on the collection, reporting, and analysis of 
data from multiple sources is still prevalent [8,11], there 
is increasing recognition of the potential of mobile data 
to help in understanding disease dynamics especially 
disease transmission and control [5,18,19]. Our 
investigation of the use of mobile data in a Nordic 
context shows that there are a number of potential 
application areas of this data which are mostly focused 
on understanding patterns of population movements. 
Population movement patterns describe how groups of 
individuals move or travel from one location to another 
and include details about geographical areas, distance, 
time, number of trips, and statistics of generic changes 
and developments of movements. These patterns are 
developed using data aggregation and analysis of raw 
mobile data generated from cellular communications to 
produce origin-destination matrices. Data aggregation is 
a process of compiling data to develop generic and 
abstract patterns of movements in an anonymized way. 
It is an essential censoring practice that involves 
anonymization measures such as time-delays, location 
approximation, and group rather than individual base 
numbers. This study shows that data aggregation is 
essential for using mobile data in a disease outbreak 
which is consistent with earlier research [16] on the 
usefulness of aggregate descriptions to understand 
human behavior and obtain usable information from 
massive amounts of data such as mobile data.  
There are two main application areas of mobile data 
which are characterized by categories of use for 
epidemiological work in the context of the Covid-19 
outbreak. First, using aggregated mobile-based data for 
informational and validation purposes. The interview 
data show that public health authorities were provided 
with access to interactive maps and visualizations that 
show patterns of population movements in terms of total 
number of trips on a certain day or week, distances 
travelled, travel times, travel routes, and general 
changes in travel behaviour (i.e. during Easter 2020 
Sweden witnessed 40% decrease in travel compared to 
the previous year). Public health authorities were able to 
use informational data for a variety of purposes such as 
understanding and validating commitment to public 
health measures as well as providing insights into 
potential risk areas where the rate of travel and 
movement is high. Second, using aggregated mobile-
based data as data complements for epidemiological 
modelling and the development of prediction models. 
While it is not yet clear how to use mobile data by 
epidemiologists, our study shows insights into using this 
data as complements for existing data (i.e. demographic 
data) obtained by public health authorities from multiple 
sources. This involves using detailed information from 
mobile data about how people move to complement 
predictive models to make short-term predictions about 
disease transmission activity and develop situational 
awareness of the impact of public measures such as 
lockdowns and school closures. In Norway, NIPH used 
mobile data for the development of predictive models 
used for purposes such as the municipal population 
model and the individual based model. In Sweden, 
certain parameters (i.e. contact intensity) were used to 
complement the development of epidemiological 
models using insights from mobile data.  
While using mobile data as validation and 
complementary data may offer novel opportunities for 
epidemiologists during disease outbreaks, the fact that 
they are subject to aggregation may result in limitations 
for their potential. The interview data show that 
limitations are related to data accuracy which can be 
compromised because of relying on mobile cells and 
time delays for anonymity purposes. For instance, the 
exact location of an individual is approximated making 
it hard to achieve accuracy in understanding spatial 
dynamics of disease transmission. There are also 
limitations in the richness of mobile data since personal 
information such as demographics about the 
individuals, which are critical in epidemiological 
modelling, cannot be collected or aggregated due to 
privacy rules. The telecom companies providing 
aggregated datasets from their mobile data to public 
health authorities do not know themselves such 
information, especially that this kind of personal 
information is strictly regulated internally as well as by 
GDPR. When we asked our survey respondents if they 
would accept relaxing EU and national privacy 
regulations to combat the Covid-19 disease outbreak, ca. 
60% were against the idea, ca. 32% were pro the idea, 
whereas 8% said in certain situations, such as: “if 
Covid-19 becomes worse”, “in scientific(statistical) 
proven hotspots that can prevent the further harm and 
spread”, “in extreme, dire situations”, “only when 
people have given informed consent”, “In a situation 
where the health care system can't keep up” and related 
concerns. Further, it is important to acknowledge that 
mobile data is just one source of data among many other 
critical data sources used in epidemiological modelling. 
Mobile data may be useful as complements to other 
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types of data which limits their scope in epidemiological 
work. In general, the problem of generalization and 
abstraction in data aggregation is not particular to using 
mobile data in disease outbreaks, but rather it is a 
common problem in big data aggregation [16].  
Finally, these limitations cannot be separated from 
concerns about individual privacy. In fact, data 
aggregation is essentially done to protect the anonymity 
and privacy of individuals besides generating 
meaningful outcomes of massive amounts of data. It is 
therefore reasonable to argue that privacy concerns 
cause many of the limitations on the use of mobile data 
in disease outbreaks despite their potential. Our survey 
data show that while people generally think that using 
mobile data to understand population movement 
patterns may be beneficial to public health 
organizations, the majority still believes that the 
organizations involved in data collection and analysis 
cannot guarantee their individual privacy. This is 
despite the fact that more than half of our respondents, 
regardless of their nationality (ca. 53%), trust the 
authorities when it comes to obtaining patterns of 
population movements using mobile data, while the rest 
remain skeptical about such practices.   
6. Implications for practice  
The analysis and discussion of our empirical data 
offers a number of implications for practice which can 
inform action to use mobile data for understanding 
population movement patterns during the Covid-19 
outbreak. These include sharing resources and expertise 
between health agencies and telecom companies, 
extended collaboration with multiple network operators, 
cross-disciplinary collaboration among multiple parties, 
developing data and privacy guidelines, and developing 
novel methods and tools to address the trade-off 
between maintaining individual privacy and obtaining 
rich and detailed information from mobile data. Each of 
these implications is discussed below.  
While our study shows that public health 
organizations recognize the potential of using mobile 
data in pandemic situations, there is lack of 
understanding how to leverage this data and generate 
value from it. This calls for quick action for sharing both 
resources and expertise between health organizations 
and telecom operators to address the urgent need of 
understanding disease transmission dynamics. Also, 
while mobile communication produce massive amounts 
of mobile data [1,5], usually network operators have a 
certain share of the mobile market which may cause 
limitations in the spatial and temporal outreach of the 
data. This may suggest that data about wider population 
movement patterns can be limited and there might be a 
need for an extended collaboration with multiple 
operators at the national level in order to access more 
geographical areas. The ability to understand wider 
population movement patterns may facilitate quick 
action and effective mitigation and control measures. 
This is especially true when the number of cases is low, 
which is critical in controlling and stopping disease 
transmission. In the longer term, this might help with 
preparedness measures in early stages of the pandemic.  
In addition, leveraging the full potential of mobile 
data may require both public health organizations and 
mobile network operators to develop guidelines 
regarding potential data and user privacy issues. The 
lack of guidelines on privacy issues can be problematic 
as reported earlier in literature [5,18] due to limitations 
in using the data because of the trade-off between 
maintaining people’s privacy and obtaining detailed and 
meaningful information about population movement 
patterns from the data. This urges action by policy 
makers to enact measures for sharing effective datasets 
with public health organizations without compromising 
individual privacy. It also urges action by data experts 
to develop tools that can reduce the level of abstraction 
for better representation of reality.   
7. Conclusions and future research   
This study investigates the use of mobile data for 
understanding patterns of population movements in 
relation to Covid-19 transmission. The use of mobile 
data in a global pandemic situation has rarely been 
studied before due to its novelty and suddenness. The 
current study contributes with empirical insights into 
their use by public health agencies during the Covid-19 
outbreak in Sweden and Norway. These insights show 
that mobile data is a novel data source that can be used 
by epidemiologists for validation and complementary 
purposes. This is one important contribution which 
addresses the first research question. Using mobile data 
in complementary ways can help in offering 
opportunities for better development of epidemiological 
models and tools that use timely information which is 
critical for better analysis and prediction of disease 
transmission. Also, the current study contributes with a 
number of key implications for practice which are aimed 
at both immediate and future actions. These 
implications are focused on developing strategies for 
using mobile data through cross-disciplinary 
collaborations among data experts, epidemiologists and 
privacy officers. They are also focused on developing 
guidelines to address privacy matters which have been 
found to affect the extent to which mobile data can be 
useful for epidemiological work. In addition, it is 
important to mention that these implications are 
observed in an environment where laws and regulations 
makes it hard to implement privacy-invading tracking of 
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individuals. We believe that they can be relevant to 
inform health authorities in other contexts with a similar 
regulatory environment. We therefore suggest that the 
development of regulatory and privacy frameworks, the 
design of tools and methods for the analysis of effective 
and meaningful abstractions from massive amounts of 
data, and the application of mobile data in developing 
predictive epidemiological models can all be key areas 
for a future research agenda.  
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